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ABSTRACT     
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF LABOR UNIONIZATION ON  
CORPORATE INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY 
 
 
 
 
August 2015 
 
 
Yu Zhang, B.S.M., Central University of Finance and Economics 
M.S.F., University of Massachusetts Boston 
M.S.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
 
Directed by Professor Surjit Tinaikar 
 
 This paper examines the relationship between labor unionization rates and 
corporate investment efficiency using 55,300 firm-year observations from 1983–2002. I 
find evidence that labor unionization rates are negatively associated with 
underinvestment and overinvestment, which suggests that labor unions can improve 
investment efficiency. I also find that labor unions and financial reporting quality are 
complementary in improving investment efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
 Employees are vital assets in a firm, particularly in labor-intensive industries. 
Labor unions represent groups of individual workers and help the workers protect their 
job securities and benefits. To meet this purpose, labor unions have a powerful effect on 
corporate investment decision making through strikes or stakeholder activism. In 2004, as 
reported in the New York Times, labor unions urged Ford Motor Company to increase 
investment in its facilities in the United States instead of in other developing countries, 
which increased job opportunities for domestic workers. Recently, CBS News reported 
that a labor union is going to resist the construction of an NFL stadium near Los Angeles. 
This union has been gathering petition signatures to delay the project’s development and 
force them to provide more benefits for workers before construction begins, such as 
commitments that create jobs for the community. These are examples of how labor 
unions can both increase and decrease corporate investments. This naturally leads us to 
an interesting question: If labor unions play a role in investment decision-making, do they 
affect the efficiency of such investments? 
The relevant literature also provides ample evidence that labor unions influence 
investment decision-making in firms. Baldwin (1983) documents that unions work as 
rent-seekers and have incentives to extract quasi-rents from firms through strikes or other
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stakeholder activities. Managers in highly unionized firms invest less intensively in 
research and development (R&D) in an attempt to mitigate the rent-seeking activities of 
labor unions (Connolly, Hirsch, & Hirschey, 1986). Bronars and Deere (1993) suggest 
that firms tend to decrease investment in specific durable assets and reduce employment 
growth in response to union contracts. Additionally, Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006) 
find that labor unions induce firms to invest less in long-term or high-risk projects. They 
suggestthat labor unions impact corporate investment. I extend this evidence further to 
test their impact on corporate investment efficiency.  
Prior studies provide abundant evidence that agency cost is the main driver of 
investment inefficiency (i.e., underinvestment and overinvestment). For instance, when 
there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, managers tend to invest 
in negative present value projects (overinvestment) to maximize their own interests 
(Jenson, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Further, agency costs between less informed 
new investors and informed managers cause firms’ stock prices to be discounted thereby 
leading to underinvestment (Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Recent accounting 
literature on labor unions has shown evidence that labor unions perform a monitoring role 
of reducing agency costs between managers and investors (Banning & Chiles, 2007; 
Chyz et al. 2013; Farber et al., 2010; Huang Jiang, Lie, & Que, 2014; Leung, Li, & Rui, 
2010). Besides labor unions’ aim to protect unionized workers’ long-term job security, 
unions also care about their firm’s sustainability. A firm’s underinvestment and 
overinvestment issues will hurt its long-term growth. Therefore, labor unions should be 
able to use their monitoring power to alleviate investment inefficiency. 
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1.2. Research Questions 
 Based on the above discussion, my first research question is: are labor 
unionization rates associated with investment efficiency? Because higher financial 
reporting quality enhances investment efficiency by playing a monitoring role of 
reducing agency cost (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009), which is similar to the role 
played by labor unions, my next question is: How do labor unions affect investment 
efficiency when financial reporting quality is high? To answer my first question, I posit 
in my first two hypotheses that labor unionization is negatively (positively) associated 
with underinvestment and with overinvestment. My third hypothesis is that labor unions 
and financial reporting quality are complementary (or substitutes) in mitigating 
investment inefficiency problem.  
1.3. Empirical Work 
Three key constructs in this analysis are the measurement of investment 
inefficiency, the measurement of labor unions, and the measurement of financial 
reporting quality. Following Richardson (2006), I define positive or negative residuals 
acquiring from the expected investment expenditure model as a proxy for investment 
inefficiency. With the lack of a firm-level union database for publicly traded U.S. firms, I 
follow prior literature and use an industry-level unionization rate as a proxy (Connolly, 
Hirsch, & Hirschey, 1986; Huang et al., 2014; Klasa, Maxwell, & Ortiz-Molina, 2009). 
Following Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I take accruals quality (AQ) as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality, which is based on the idea that accruals improve the 
informativeness of earnings by excluding transitory fluctuations in cash flow.  
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My testing results show significantly negative association between labor unions 
and underinvestment and overinvestment in both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression and logistic regression. This means that firms with stronger union power face 
fewer underinvestment and overinvestment problems. I also find that, labor unions and 
financial reporting quality are complementary in improving investment efficiency. 
1.4. Structure of the Study  
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related 
literature on underinvestment and overinvestment problem, the role of labor unions in 
firm decisions, and the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research 
design. Section 5 shows the sample construction and data collection. Section 6 presents 
the main empirical results. Section 7 and Section 8 conclude the study and discuss further 
research work, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In the theory of perfect capital markets, firms make investments until the marginal 
benefit of capital investment equals the marginal costs. Managers should invest in the 
positive net present value projects and make decisions in the best interests of 
shareholders. However, firms do not operate in such a world. The existence of capital 
market frictions stimulate firms in addition to optimal investments, which causes 
underinvestment or overinvestment. 
2.1. Determinants of Underinvestment 
 Under market imperfections, information asymmetries can drive firm 
underinvestment, along with the agency cost between shareholders and debtholders 
(Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Myers first brings the view that the existence of 
risky debt will stimulate managers to pass up positive net present value investment 
opportunities, which causes firm underinvestment. Under the assumption that managers 
are acting in favor of shareholders, they will try to make all investments with positive net 
present value to maximize their firm’s value. However, Myers shows that if a firm is 
financed with risky debt, managers will make investment decisions by following a 
different rule. His model shows that issuing risky debt at time 0 weakens the firm’s 
incentive to invest at time 1, induces a suboptimal strategy, and reduces the firm’s present 
market value. As a result, current shareholders of the firm absorb the loss of the present 
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market value. Also, Stein (2001) points out that risky debt works as a tax on the proceeds 
derived from the new investment because most of the value increased by the new 
investments only serves debtholders. Therefore, managers, acting on behalf of 
shareholders’ interests, will probably reject some valuable investment opportunities and 
lower the firm’s value (Cariola, La Rocca, & La Rocca, 2005; Garven & MacMinn, 1993; 
Myers, 1977).  
Later, Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a classic adverse-selection model 
showing that information asymmetries between informed managers and less informed 
new investors can cause firm underinvestment. Managers who act in the interest of 
existing shareholders will raise funding for positive net present value projects to increase 
the firm’s value. New investors with less information usually ask for a higher premium to 
protect themselves from managers’ probable opportunistic behaviors. Firms raise funding 
with a discounted stock price, which may outweigh the new investment profits. As a 
result, managers may refuse to get financed at a bargain stock price and pass up good 
investment opportunities.  
Moreover, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) claim that because debtholders (banks) are 
concerned about the probability of a firm’s bankruptcy and the difficulty of monitoring a 
firm’s behavior over time, debtholders tend to raise interest rates to protect themselves 
from managers’ opportunistic behavior. Hubbard (1998) documents that costly external 
financing limits managers’ ability to raise funding for new investments. Firms may reject 
positive net present value projects due to external financing constraints, thus causing 
underinvestment (Hubbard, 1998).  
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Some prior studies have discussed possible mechanisms mitigating the 
underinvestment problem. Berkovitch and Kim (1990) document that increases in the 
seniority rule to new debt will reduce underinvestment. Garven and Macminn (1993) 
propose that a designed insurance covenant can eliminate underinvestment issues and 
keep current shareholders receiving higher gains. Wu and Wang (2005) predict that firms 
with a small amount of private benefit can alleviate underinvestment problems and add 
value to the firm. Gay and Nam (1998) provide evidence that firms could use derivatives 
to avoid potential underinvestment problems. Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) examines a 
sample of 49,543 firm-year observations to show that financial reporting quality is 
negatively correlated with underinvestment. They point out that the negative association 
between financial quality and underinvestment is even stronger in firms facing financing 
constraints.  
2.2. Determinants of Overinvestment 
There is a considerable amount of literature that has suggested that agency cost is 
the main driver of firms’ overinvestment issues. Under the agency cost explanation, 
managers are agents of shareholders, and the relationship between managers and 
shareholders usually contains conflicting interests (Jenson, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). When there is difficulty in monitoring managers’ roles, managers have incentives 
to invest in projects that maximize their own benefits.Thiscan be costly for shareholders 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling). Jenson (1986) suggest that managers could 
invest in negative present value projects and cause firms to grow beyond their optimal 
size. Stulz (1990) find that managers tend to invest “as much as possible” to acquire 
perquisites from investment. Holmstrom (1999) document that managers’ concerns 
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regarding their future careers will affect the way they make investment decisions for their 
firms. Managers prefer a “quiet life” under poorly governed firms (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2003). 
There is also a positive relation between investment expenditure and internally 
generated cash flow (Hubbard, 1988; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). According to agency 
cost theory, if there are divergences in principal-agent interests, managers with free cash 
flow may engage in wasteful investments (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Harford (1999) 
document that cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitionsAfter these 
acquisitions, the operating performance of cash-rich firms appear to decline abnormally. 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson (1999) show that companies with extra cash are 
likely to spend more on acquisitions, even for poor investment opportunities. Blanchard, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (1994) find evidence of 11 firms receiving cash windfalls 
which ends up resulting in wasteful expenditure. Perhaps the most direct evidence of 
overinvestment of free cash flow is from Richardson (2006). He measures 
overinvestment and free cash flow by using an accounting-based framework. He provides 
evidence that firms with free cash flow are more likely to overinvest.  
However, the second explanation of the positive relation between investment 
expenditure and internally generated free cash flow is external financing constraints 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988; Fazzari & Petersen, 1993; Hubbard, 1998). Costly 
external financing resources will push firms to invest more of their internally generated 
cash flow in response to the lower cost of capital (Hubbard, 1998). Fazzari et al. (1988) 
find evidence that if the cost disadvantage of external finance is high, a firm’s investment 
is sensitive to the fluctuation of internally generated free cash flow. However, later 
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literature has cast doubt on the financing constraints hypothesis. Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) document that financing constraints are not necessarily positively correlated with 
the sensitivity of investment decisions to cash flow. They find evidence that with fewer 
financing constraints, firms appear more sensitive.  
Prior research has provided various possible mechanisms mitigating the 
overinvestment issue. Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) investigate the relation between 
financial reporting quality and investment efficiency. They document that higher 
financial reporting quality can improve investment efficiency. They also find evidence 
that higher financial reporting quality can mitigate overinvestment problems, especially 
for firms with large cash balances. 
2.3. Role of Labor Unions 
The impact of labor unions on firm investment decisions has been studied for 
decades. Earlier research work has posited that labor unions have a negative effect on 
firm operations. Hirsch (1991) finds that unionized firms have significantly lower profits. 
Since labor unions work as rent-seekers, they have an incentive to extract quasi-rents 
from firms by threatening strikes (Baldwin, 1983; Grout, 1984). To reduce labor unions’ 
rent-seeking, unionized firms decline the returns to R&D and hold lower R&D 
investments, which affect the firms’ profits (Connolly et al., 1986). Bronars and Deere 
(1993) document that incomplete union contracts drive firms to decrease some specific 
durable assets, reduce employment growth, and increase debt. Faleye et al. (2006) find 
that labor unions, similar to risky bondholders, are more concerned about whether firms 
can generate enough cash flow to pay their wages. They find that labor unions using their 
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corporate governance voices, induce firms to invest less in long-term or high-risk projects 
thereby lowering the firms’ values. 
Because labor unions aim to protect unionized workers’ benefits, rights and job 
security, they should also perform a monitoring role to increase firms’ long-term 
sustainability. Recent studies have started to pay attention to this aspect. Farber et al. 
(2010) and Leung at al. (2010) discuss that unionized firms are associated with higher 
accounting conservatism. Accounting conservatism has stricter standards to verify good 
economic gains and requires recognizing all possible losses in time, which can be used to 
monitor management behaviors and reduce agency costs (Watts, 2003). Further, Chyz, 
Leung, Li, and Rui (2013) find evidence that labor unions constrain managers’ tax 
aggressiveness via the monitoring role. Banning and Chiles (2007), Gomez and Tzioumis 
(2006), and Huang et al. (2014) show that labor union-controlled firms pay less 
compensation to their CEOs. As mentioned earlier, the main cause of overinvestment is 
the agency cost. Labor unions can mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviors resulting 
from agency conflicts. Consequently labor unions should also be able to alleviate 
overinvestment problems and protect a firm’s long-term value.  
However, there is an opposite view that labor unions may increase 
overinvestment. Labor unions normally believe that firms with good growth opportunities 
could help secure unionized workers’ long-term job security and benefits. To make a 
good impression, managers tend to invest in more new projects and have less cash on 
hand, which makes unions believe that the firm is operating and growing well. 
Sometimes managers may even engage in wasteful investment, invest in negative present 
value projects, and cause overinvestment problems. Klasa et al. (2008) find evidence that 
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unionized firms will save less cash from the current cash flow level and make larger 
capital expenditure investments than non-unionized firms.  
On the other hand, the relationship between labor unions and underinvestment 
problems is complicated and depends on which drivers have a higher impact. Faleye et al. 
(2006) show that because labor unions’ contractual stream of wages is similar to the 
payoff on high-risk debt, labor unions aligning with bondholders likely expropriate firm 
wealth, exacerbate the agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, and 
probably add to underinvestment problems. But, as mentioned before, the main goal of 
labor unions and shareholders is the same: keep the firm’s value growing in the long-
term. Underinvestment problems will harm a firm’s long-term sustainability, which 
conflicts with the main aim of labor unions. Therefore, the monitoring role of labor 
unions would likely offset the impact on causing underinvestment. Also, prior research 
has suggested that, by the nature of fixed claimants, unionized firms have lower cost of 
debt than other firms (Chen, Kacperczyk, & Ortiz-Molina, 2009). As discussed before, 
costly external financing can cause underinvestment problems, and thus unionized firms 
with less cost of debt will help reduce underinvestment problems.  
2.4. Financial Reporting Quality and Investment Efficiency 
 Prior studies have suggested that higher financial reporting quality improves a 
firm’s investment efficiency by reducing adverse selection cost and mitigating agency 
cost between managers and shareholders (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000). Verrecchia (2001) shows that good financial reporting quality could alleviate the 
adverse selection cost by reducing information asymmetry between investors and firms. 
For example, firms with more disclosure commitments reduce such asymmetry and 
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enhances stock market liquidity (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). The existence of information 
asymmetry between investors and firms could cause higher external financing costs 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Managers who face high financing constraints tend to pass on 
good investment opportunities, resulting in underinvestment problems. Chang, Dasgupta, 
and Hilary (2009) construct a dynamic adverse-selection model and empirical work to 
show that firms with better financial reporting quality find it easier to raise capital. 
Therefore, based on these findings, financial reporting quality is positively associated 
with investment efficiency through the reduction of adverse selection costs. .  
On the other side, as I discussed regarding underinvestment and overinvestment 
above, the agency cost is the main factor causing investment inefficiency. Previous 
literature has suggested that higher financial reporting quality reduces the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders through its monitoring role. Kanodia and 
Lee (1998) document that periodic performance reports, such as earnings statements, play 
an important role in monitoring managers through capital market prices. Without an 
effective monitoring mechanism, when there is a conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders, managers have incentives to maximize their own benefit but hurt 
investors’ benefits. Bushman and Smith (2001) show that financial accounting 
information contributes to managers’ monitoring role by disciplining them to invest in 
good projects and stay away from bad projects. Based on these findings, financial 
reporting quality is positively related to investment efficiency through the reduction of 
the agency cost between managers and shareholders. 
The directly empirical evidence that higher financial reporting quality can 
improve investment efficiency is derived from Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi’s (2009) work. 
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Using a sample of 49,543 firm-year observations between 1980 and 2003, they find that 
the relation between proxies for financial reporting quality and underinvestment and 
overinvestment are negative. The negative relation between financial reporting quality 
and underinvestment is stronger for firms with costly external financing. Also, firms with 
large cash balances are more strongly associated with overinvestment.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The relationship between labor unions and underinvestment is complicated. 
Because underinvestment issues hurt firms’ long-term sustainability which conflicts with 
unions’ main purpose of protecting workers’ job security and benefits, labor unions 
should use their monitoring role to reduce firms’ underinvestment problem. On the other 
hand, labor unions may increase underinvestment problems. According to prior studies, 
labor unions’ contractual stream of wages is similar to the payoff on high-risk debt 
(Faleye et al., 2006). If the payoff of high-risk debt is higher than the profits created by 
new investment projects, managers may pass on good investment opportunities thereby 
resulting in underinvestment. Financing constraints can also cause underinvestment 
issues. Consistent with the nature of rent-seekers, unionized firms have lower costs of 
debt than other firms (Chen et al., 2009), and thus labor unions may help reduce 
underinvestment problems. Based on the above discussion, I hypothesize that labor 
unionization is negatively or positively correlated with underinvestment. 
H1: Labor unionization is negatively or positively correlated with 
underinvestment 
According to the literature review, the agency conflicts between managers and 
investors mainly drive overinvestment problems. The main goal of labor unions is to 
secure unionized workers’ benefits and long-term employment, so labor unions will             
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use their power to help increase firms’ operational efficiency and long-term profitability. 
From this view, labor unions and unionized workers share the same interests with 
investors; thus, labor unions should be able to use their monitoring role to lessen firms’ 
overinvestment problems through the reduction of agency costs. However there is also a 
possibility that labor unions can increase overinvestment problems (Klasa et al., 2008). 
To make unions have a good opinion of the firms’ growth opportunities, managers may 
engage in overinvestment thereby ending up with some bad investment projects and end 
up with lower cash balances on hand. . Therefore, I posit my hypothesis of the association 
between labor unions and overinvestment as follows 
H2: Labor unionization is negatively or positively correlated with overinvestment. 
Prior research has found evidence that higher financial quality reduces both 
underinvestment and overinvestment (Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009). Financial 
reporting quality plays an important role in alleviating the agency costs between 
managers and investors, which is consistent with the monitoring role of labor unions. 
Therefore, I offer the third hypothesis that the impact of labor unions on underinvestment 
and overinvestment is affected by financial reporting quality. 
H3: Labor unions and financial reporting quality are complementary (substitutes) 
in mitigating investment inefficiency problem.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 I test my hypotheses in three steps. First, I directly use the abnormal residuals 
from the expected investment model to measure underinvestment and overinvestment. 
Second, I test the relation between labor unionization rates and underinvestment and 
overinvestment using OLS and logistic regressions. Third, I add financial reporting 
quality as an additional independent variable and the product between labor unionization 
and financial reporting quality as an interaction variable to examine the association 
between labor unions and underinvestment and overinvestment. 
 4.1. The Measurement of Underinvestment and Overinvestment 
4.1.a The measurement of investment expenditure. To construct measures of 
underinvestment and overinvestment, I follow Richardson (2006)’s mythology to 
estimate a model that predicts firm investment levels and then use residuals from this 
model as proxies for investment inefficiency. Following Richardson (2006), I define total 
investment in a given firm-year, In_Toli,t as the sum of capital expenditures (CAPXi,t), 
acquisitions (Acqi,t), and research and development expenditures (RDi,t), minus sales of 
property, plant, and equipment (SPPEi,t): 
In_Toli,t = CAPXi,t + Acqi,t + RDi,t - SPPEi,t 
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Richardson (2006) splits total investment in a given firm-year into two main 
components: a) required investment expenditure that firms use to maintain assets in 
place, In_Maintenance i,t, and b) expenditures that firms invest in new projects, In_Newi,t.  
In_Toli,t = In_Maintenance i,t + In_Newi,t 
Richardson (2006) takes amortization and depreciation expenditure as proxies for 
In_Maintenance i,t. Then In_Newi,t is decomposed into expected investment expenditure 
in new positive NPV projects, In_New*i,t, and unexpected investment, In_New
ԑ
i,t. 
Richardson (2006) defines negative unexpected investment as underinvestment and 
positive unexpected investment as overinvestment. 
In_Newi,t = In_New*i,t + In_New
ԑ
i,t   
4.1.b Expectation model for firm new investment expenditure. I follow 
Richardson (2006) and construct the expected model to estimate expected investment:  
    In_Newi,t = α + β1V/Pi,t-1 + β2Leverage i,t-1 + β3Cash i,t-1 + β4Age i,t-1 + β5Size i,t-1  
              + β6Stock Returns i,t-1 + In_New i,t-1 + ΣYear Indicator + ΣIndustry Indicator 
 The estimated value of the regression is defined as the expected level of new 
investment, In_New*i,t. The negative residual of the regression is defined as 
underinvestment and the positive residual of the regression is defined as overinvestment. 
Expected investment expenditure is a function of growth opportunities. Following 
Richardson, I estimate growth opportunities as the ratio of value of assets in place, VAIPi,t, 
to market value of equity, P, V/P. 
VAIPi,t = (1 – αr)BVi,t + α(1+r)Xi,t – αrdi,t 
BVi,t is the book value of common equity in a given firm-year, Xi,t is operating income 
after depreciation in a given firm-year, and di,t is annual dividends. α = (ω/(1+r-ω). ω is a 
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fixed abnormal earnings persistence parameter from the Ohlson (1995) framework, and r 
is the discount rate. I use Richardson’s results, ω = 0.62 and r =12%, in my analysis.  
 Additional control variables that have been shown in previous research regarding 
to the determinants of investment decisions are included in the expectation model 
(Richardson), including leverage, cash level, firm age, firm size, past stock returns, and 
previous year’s expected investment expenditure on new projects. Hubbard (1998) 
suggest that when a firm has more difficulty raising additional cash to invest in new 
projects, the firm’s investment will be less. Leverage, firm size, firm age, and the level of 
cash can capture this feature. Prior stock returns can capture growth opportunities not 
reflected in V/Pi,t (Lamont, 2000), and prior firm level investment can capture non-
modeled firm characteristics that affect investing decisions (Richardson). Year and 
industry indicators can capture additional variation in new investment expenditure not 
covered by the measure of growth opportunities and financing constraints (Richardson). 
4.2. The Measurement of Labor Unions 
The literature on labor unions has typically used unionization rates as the measure 
of unions’ bargaining power because unions’ bargaining strength is highly associated 
with the percentage of unionized employees within a firm. A larger percentage of 
unionized workers has more impact on a firm when unions engage in some activities. In 
the United States, there is no publically available database for firm-level unionization 
data within publically traded firms. Most prior studies of labor unions have used industry 
unionization rates as proxies for the unionization rates of individual firms within an 
industry (Bronars & Deere, 1991; Chen et al., 2009; Connolly et al., 1986; Huang et al., 
2014; Klasa et al., 2009).  
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I, therefore, follow the lead of previous literature and collect industry level 
unionization rates from the Union Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD), created 
by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson in 2002. For this study, the database provide 
private and public sector labor union membership, coverage, and density estimates 
derived from the monthly household Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The detailed estimates of union membership, coverage, 
density of state, and industry occupation begin in 1983. The CPS uses the Census 
Industry Classification (CIC) code as the industry indicator. CIC code corresponds with 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from 1983–2002. After 2002, CIC code 
has corresponded to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). I 
examine the data sample from 1983–2002. I follow Farber’s (2010) method to map a CIC 
code to a SIC of all COMPUSTAT firms for each year, which enables me to link industry 
unionization rates to firms from the COMPUSTAT database. In the mapping procedure, 
following the technical documents from the CPS database and US Census Bureau’s 
website, the majority of unique SIC codes has an exact corresponding CIC code. If a SIC 
code does not match with an exact CIC code, I assign the corresponding CIC code based 
on the actual industry name. If a SIC code from the COMPUSTAT database matches 
with multiple CIC codes, I take a simple average of all CIC codes as the unionization rate 
of the SIC code. CIC code is normally in a three-digit format. I create mappings of three-
digit CIC code to two-digit SIC code, to three-digit SIC code, and to four-digit SIC code. 
Comparing these three mappings, I find that, under the mapping of three-digit CIC code 
to two-digit SIC code, there are many more SIC codes from the COMPUSTAT database 
corresponding to multiple CIC codes, which results in more SIC codes from 
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COMPUSTAT database’s using an average value of multiple CIC codes’ unionization 
rates. This means much lower accuracy than the mapping of three-digit CIC code to 
three-digit and four-digit SIC code. According to the technical documents from the CPS 
database, the majority of CIC codes corresponds to three-digit SIC code formats, but 
there are several CIC codes corresponding to four-digit SIC codes. Under these 
conditions, I need to round these four-digit SIC codes to three digits, which could cause 
inaccuracy. Therefore, I decide to use the mapping of three-digit SIC code to four-digit 
SIC code for the further research analysis. 
4.3. The Measurement of Financial Reporting Quality 
Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) defines conceptual financial reporting quality as 
“the accuracy with which financial reporting conveys information about the firm’s 
operations, in particular its expected cash flows, in order to inform investors in terms of 
equity investment decisions” (p.8 ). The definition is consistent with FASB–SFAC No. 8, 
which states that the objective of financial reporting is to provide useful financial 
information to primary users in decision making. Present and potential investors can use 
financial information to assess a firm’s expected future cash inflows and make 
investment decisions. Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) measure financial reporting 
quality by using accruals quality. This measurement of financial reporting quality has 
been shown in prior studies (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002). The idea is 
that accruals are estimates of future cash flows, and earnings will be more predicative of 
future cash flows when there is less estimation error embedded in the accruals process. 
Following Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), I estimate discretionary accruals using the 
Dechow and Dichev model and add fundamental variables in the Jones (1991) model, 
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which is suggested by McNichols. The model is a regression of working capital accruals 
on lagged, current, and future cash flows plus the change in revenue and PPE. All 
variables are deflated by average total assets. 
Accrualsi,t = α + β1*CashFlowi,t-1 + β2*CashFlowi,t + β3*CashFlowi,t+1  
 + β4*∆Revenuei,t + β5*PPEi,t + ԑi,t 
Where Accruals = (∆CA - ∆Cash) – (∆CL - ∆STD) – Dep 
∆CA = Change in current assets 
∆Cash = Change in cash/cash equivalents 
∆CL = Change in current liabilities 
∆STD = Change in short-term debt 
Dep = Depreciation and amortization expense 
CashFlow = Net income before extraordinary items - Accruals 
∆Revenue = Change in revenue  
PPE = Gross property, plant, and equipment 
I estimate the model by running the cross-sectional regression for each industry 
with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-
industry classification, following Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009). The standard 
deviation of firm-level residuals from the model during the years between t-5 and t-1 are 
proxies for accruals quality at year t, AQi,t. I multiply accruals quality by -1, so accruals 
quality increases in financial report quality. 
4.4. Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment 
 I take negative residuals multiplying by -1 as proxies for underinvestment for a 
given firm year, Under_Ini,t and positive residuals from the expected investment 
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expenditure model as proxies for overinvestment for a given firm year, Over_Ini,t. To 
investigate the relation between labor unions and underinvestment and overinvestment, I 
first run OLS regressions between labor unions and underinvestment and overinvestment: 
Underr_Ini,t (Over_Ini,t) = α +ϭ1Unioni,t + ԑi,t 
Second, I add financial report quality into the equation to examine the association 
between labor unions and underinvestment and overinvestment: 
 Under_Ini,t (Over_Ini,t) = α + ϭ1Unioni,t + ϭ2AQi,t + ϭ3Union*AQi,t + ԑi,t 
Third, I create direction indictors for underinvestment and overinvestment. Negative 
(positive) residuals are classified in two categories. If a firm’s residual is lower than the 
sample’s median value, I define it as the less underinvestment and overinvestment firm; if 
a firm’s residual is higher than the median value of the sample, I define it as the more 
underinvestment and overinvestment firm. I then run logistic regressions for the above 
equations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA CONSTRUCTION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 The main empirical tests of this study use two data sources. First, financial 
statement data are compiled from the COMPUSTAT North America annual database, 
which includes active and inactive securities. I only include firms with U.S. headquarters 
in my data sample because I focus on the analysis of U.S. unionization and 
underinvestment and overinvestment. I exclude financial firms with SIC codes from 
6000–6999 from my data sample because financial firms normally have different 
operating, investing, and financing activities from other firms. The sample of the 
expected investment expenditure model covers the fiscal years 1983–2002 with 74,933 
firm-year observations. Second, I obtain annual U.S. industry unionization data from the 
UMCD. To test the relation between labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment, I merge the labor unions dataset with the investment expenditure model 
data sample and acquire a sample of 53,500 firm-year observations from 1983–2002. 
Third, I calculate AQ as a proxy for financial reporting quality during the fiscal years 
1983-2002 and merge it with the data sample of labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment. This yields a sample of 33,091 firm-year observations.  
 In the empirical tests, following Richardson (2006) and Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 
(2009)  (2009), I scale all financial variables by total average asset, and to reduce the 
influence of outliers, I winsorize all variables except for firm age, labor union, and 
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indicator variables at 1% and 99% levels by year. Further, I re-perform all tests using 
rank regressions and find results similar to the reported results. The detailed description 
of each variable is shown in Appendix A.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, I first present the replication results of Richardson (2006). I 
enlarge his sample period from 1988–2002 to 1983–2002 and discuss the results. Next, I 
show the regression results between labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment. Finally, I add financial reporting quality as a new independent variable 
and show the results for both OLS regressions and logistic regressions. 
6.1. Replication Results of Richardson (2006)  
My data sample is from 1983–2002 with 74,933 firm-year observations because 
the data retrieved on industry unions from the UMCD are available from 1983. I expect 
to include more data to investigate the relationship between labor unions and 
underinvestment and overinvestment in the later analysis. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Investment Expenditure 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 This table reports summary statistics of investment expenditure variables, growth 
opportunity variables, and the other control variables used in the expected investment 
expenditure model. The sample covers 74,933 firm years with available COMPUSTAT 
data from 1983–2002. In_Tol is total investment expenditure. CAPX is capital 
expenditure. Acq is acquisition expenditure. RD is research and development 
expenditure. SPPE is the cash flow from sale of property, plant, and equipment. 
In_Maintenance is investment expenditure necessary to maintain assets in place, which is 
estimated by reported depreciation and amortization from cash flow statement. In_New is 
the difference between In_Tol and In_Maintenance. All expenditure variables are scaled 
by average total assets. The control variables are reported with lagged values which are 
used in the expected model. The detailed variable information is in Appendix A.  
 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
In_Tol  0.131  0.146 -0.077 0.808 
CAPX  0.068  0.072 0.000 0.411 
Aqc  0.021  0.064 -0.002 0.412 
RD  0.047  0.100 0.000 0.604 
SPPE  0.007  0.023 0.000 0.162 
In_Maintenance  0.059  0.047 0.001 0.296 
In_New  0.072  0.151 -0.281 0.862 
Lag_V/P  0.518  1.058 -6.122 3.615 
Lag_Leverage  0.358  0.440 -1.687 3.210 
Lag_Cash  0.192  0.369 0.000 4.761 
Lag_Age  2.110  1.079 0.000 4.331 
Lag_Size  4.311  2.137 -1.328 9.730 
Lag_Stock Returns  0.246  1.009 -0.895 6.464 
Lag_In_New   0.081  0.152 -0.259 0.847 
 
 Table 1—Panel A presents the summary statistics of investment expenditure 
variables, growth opportunity variables, and other control variables used in the expected 
investment expenditure model. The average total investment activity costs for firms is 
13.1% of firm assets. The main component of total investment costs is capital 
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expenditure with 6.8% of firm assets, and R&D expenditure takes the second place with 
4.7% of firm assets. On average, 45% of total investment costs are used for maintaining 
existing assets and the rest is used to invest in new projects. Panel B shows the 
correlation coefficients for the main variables of the expected investment model. We can 
see that each variable is correlated with others with significance. 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 This table shows the Spearman correlation coefficients of investment expenditure 
and control variables used in the expected investment expenditure model. The sample 
covers 74,933 firm-years with available COMPUSTAT data from 1983–2002. The 
control variables are reported with lagged values used in the expected model. The 
detailed variable information is in Appendix A.  
 
Variable In_New Lag_V/P Lag_Leverage Lag_Cash Lag_Age Lag_Size 
Lag_Stock 
Returns 
Lag_V/P -0.0784       
 (<.0001)       
Lag_Leverage -0.1602 -0.1266      
 (<.0001) (<.0001)      
Lag_Cash 0.2548 -0.0752 -0.2076     
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)     
Lag_Age -0.1378 0.1240 0.0624 -0.1875    
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)    
Lag_Size -0.0875 0.1566 0.1382 -0.2171 0.4214   
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)   
Lag_Stock 
Returns 0.1417 -0.0213 -0.0453 0.2558 -0.0161 -0.0884  
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  
Lag_In_New 0.5272 -0.0729 -0.0837 0.2320 -0.1952 -0.0966 0.0953 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 2 
Expected Investment Expenditure Analysis 
 This table tests the expected new investment expenditure, following Richardson 
(2006). The determinants of investment expenditure contain the measures of growth 
opportunities, leverage, cash balance, firm age, firm size, stock returns, yearly fixed 
effects, and annual fixed effects. The sample covers 74,993 firm-year observations from 
1983–2002. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients and are 
corrected for time-series correlation using Huber-White standard errors. The detailed 
variable description is in Appendix A. 
       
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign  Model   
      I II III IV 
Lag_V/P 
- 
 
-
0.011   -0.005 
 
 
 
(-
15.84)   (-8.85) 
Lag_Leverage -    -0.033 -0.031 
     (-21.28) (-19.56) 
Lag_Cash +    0.042 0.029 
     (19.11) (13.38) 
Lag_Age -    -0.003 -0.004 
     (-5.57) (-7.05) 
Lag_Size +    0.001 0.002 
     (2.58) (7.46) 
Lag_Stock Returns +    0.010 0.011 
     (15.62) (17.01) 
Lag_In_New +    0.481 0.433 
     (77.28) (69.94) 
Year Indicators   NO YES NO YES 
Industry Indicators   NO YES NO YES 
Adjusted R2     0.006 0.126 0.309 0.336 
 
Table 2 shows regression results for four expected investment expenditures 
models. Following Richardson (2006), I run pooled regression for these four models with 
Huber-White robust standard errors. Model I contains only the accounting-based measure 
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of growth opportunities, V/P, which only explains 0.6% of the variation in In_New. 
Model II tests only on fixed annual and industry effects, which explains 12.6% of the 
variation in In_New. Model III run the pooled regression for the control variables, 
resulting in 30.9% of the variation. Model IV includes all variables and explains 33.9% 
of the variation. In subsequent analyses, I obtain residuals as proxies for underinvestment 
and overinvestment by ruining pooled regression on Model IV. 
6.2. Results for Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment 
 To investigate the relation between labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment, I merge the industry unionization rates sample with the sample that 
covers negative/positive residuals from the expected investment expenditure model from 
1983–2002, which leave me 53,500 firm-year observations. Table 3—Panel A reports the 
summary statistics of labor unions and underinvestment and overinvestment. We can see 
that around 60% (31,879/53,500) of observations deal with underinvestment and the rest 
overinvestment. The maximum industry unionization strength is about 84% of an 
industry, and the average industry unionization rate is about 13%. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 This table reports the summary statistics of labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment. The sample covers 53,500 firm-year observations. Under_In are negative 
residuals from the expected investment expenditure multiplied by -1. Over_In are 
positive residuals from the expected investment expenditure. The detailed variable 
description is in Appendix A. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Under_In 31,879 0.065 0.070 0.000 0.721 
Over_In 21,621 0.097 0.129 0.000 0.982 
Union 53,500 0.127 0.132 0.000 0.836 
 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation coefficients 
 
Variable Union 
Under_In -0.1343 
(N=31,879) (<.0001) 
Over_In -0.1087 
(N=21,621) (<.0001) 
Dummy_Over -0.1228 
(N=21,621) (<.0001) 
Dummy_Under -0.1504 
(N=31,879) (<.0001) 
 
 
Table 3—Panel B shows the strong negative association between labor unions and 
underinvestment and overinvestment, which suggests that the stronger the labor union, 
the lower the underinvestment and overinvestment. Further, Table 4—Panel A and Panel 
B show the results of running OLS regression and logistic regression. Both methods 
present strong negative correlations between labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment with high significance. 
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Table 4 
 
Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment 
 
Panel A: OLS Regression and Logistic Regression for Labor Unions and 
Underinvestment 
 
 This table shows the relation between labor unions and underinvestment.  The 
sample covers 31,879 firm-year observations. In the OLS regression, negative residuals 
from the expected investment expenditure model multiplied by -1 are a proxy for 
underinvestment. In logistic regression, I create a dummy variable of Under_In to 
indicate more or less underinvestment. If residual > median value of residuals in the 
sample, I define it as more underinvestment, and then equals to 1. If residual < median 
value of residuals in the sample, I define it as less underinvestment, and then equals to 0. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients and are corrected for time-
series correlation using Huber-White standard errors clustered by firms. The detailed 
variable description is in Appendix A. 
 
Under_Ini,t (Dummy_Under) = α +ϭ1Unioni,t + ԑi,t 
Model   Α ϭ1 
Adjusted 
R2 
OLS Regression 
 0.074 -0.708 0.018 
 (92.62) (-20.67)  
  α ϭ1 Pseudo R2 
Logistic 
Regression 
 0.299 -2.385 0.017 
  (18.79) (-25.95)   
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Panel B: OLS Regression and Logistic Regression for Labor Unions and 
Overinvestment 
 
 This table shows the relation between labor unions and overinvestment. The 
sample covers 21,621 firm-year observations. In the OLS regression, positive residuals 
from the expected investment expenditure model are a proxy for overinvestment. In the 
logistic regression, I create a dummy variable of Over_In to indicate more or less 
overinvestment. If residual > median value of residuals in the sample, I define it as more 
overinvestment, and then equals to 1. If residual < median value of residuals in the 
sample, I defined it as less overinvestment, and then equals to 0. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficients and are corrected for time-series correlation using 
Huber-White standard errors clustered by firms. The detailed variable description is in 
Appendix A. 
 
Over_Ini,t (Dummy_Over) = α +ϭ1Unioni,t + ԑi,t 
Model   α ϭ1 Adjusted R2 
OLS Regression 
 0.110 -0.106 0.012 
 (65.67) (-14.03)  
  α ϭ1 Pseudo R2 
Logistic Regression 
 0.242 -1.916 0.011 
  (12.56) (-17.26)   
 
 
 
6.3. Results for Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment (Add Financial 
Reporting Quality)   
 
As I discussed in the section 2.4, financial reporting quality can improve 
investment efficiency. According to Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), financial reporting 
quality mitigates underinvestment and overinvestment problems by reducing the agency 
cost between managers and investors. This study holds a similar view regarding the 
monitoring role of labor unions. For this section, I add a new independent variable of AQ 
as a proxy for financial reporting quality and create a continuous interaction variable of 
Union*AQ in my tests. After merging the labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment data sample with the AQ sample, I get a sample of 33,091 firm-year 
observations from 1983–2002.  
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment 
(Add Financial Reporting Quality) 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 
 This table reports the summary statistics of labor unions and underinvestment and 
overinvestment. The sample covers 33,091 firm-year observations. Under_In is negative 
residuals from the expected investment expenditure multiplied by -1. Over_In is positive 
residuals from the expected investment expenditure. AQ is a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. Union*AQ is the product of unionization rate and AQ as the interaction variable. 
The detailed variable description is in Appendix A. 
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Over_In 13,509 0.085 0.118 0.000 0.914 
Under_In 19,582 0.057 0.062 0.000 0.721 
Union 33,091 0.139 0.139 0.000 0.858 
AQ 33,091 -0.075 0.079 -0.475 -0.004 
Union*AQ 33,091 -0.007 0.009 -0.054 0.000 
 
 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation coefficients  
 
Variable Union Over_In Under_In Dummy_Over Dummy_Under AQ 
Over_In -0.1142      
(N=13,590) (<.0001)      
Under_In -0.1430      
(N=19,582) (<.0001)      
Dummy_Over -0.1275 0.5656     
(N=13,590) (<.0001) (<.0001)     
Dummy_Under -0.1568  0.6187    
(N=19,582) (<.0001)  (<.0001)    
AQ 0.2645 -0.2171 -0.2375 -0.1553 -0.1733  
(N=33,091) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  
Union*AQ -0.4632 -0.0879 -0.0670 -0.0439 -0.0424 0.4499 
(N=33,091) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 6 
 
Labor Unions and Underinvestment and Overinvestment (Add Financial Reporting 
Quality) 
 
Panel A: OLS Regression and Logistic Regression for Labor Unions and 
Underinvestment (Add Financial Reporting Quality) 
 
 This table shows the relation between labor unions and underinvestment. The 
sample covers 19,582 firm-year observations. In the OLS regression, negative residuals 
from the expected investment expenditure model multiplied by -1 are a proxy for 
underinvestment. In the logistic regression, I create a dummy variable of Under_In to 
indicate more or less underinvestment. If residual > median value of residuals in the 
sample, I define it as more underinvestment, and then equals to 1. If residual < median 
value of residuals in the sample, I define it as less underinvestment, and then equals to 0. 
AQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality. Union*AQ is the product of unionization 
rate and AQ as the interaction variable. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients and are corrected for time-series correlation using Huber-White standard 
errors clustered by firms. The detailed variable description is in Appendix A. 
 
Under_Ini,t (Dummy_Under) = α + ϭ1Unioni,t + ϭ2AQi,t + ϭ3Union*AQi,t + ԑi,t 
Model   α ϭ1 ϭ2 ϭ3 Adjusted R2 
OLS Regression 
 0.050 -0.476 -0.160 -0.200 0.064 
 43.27 (-10.42) (-12.21) (-2.11)  
  α ϭ1 ϭ2 ϭ3 Pseudo R2 
Logistic Regression 
 0.025 -2.720 -2.637 -20.989 0.035 
  0.8 (-16.30) (-8.30) (-7.58)   
 
Panel B: OLS Regression and Logistic Regression for Labor Unions and 
Overinvestment (Add Financial Reporting Quality) 
 
 This table tests the relation between labor unions and overinvestment. The sample 
covers 13,509 firm-year observations. In the OLS regression, positive residuals from the 
expected investment expenditure model are a proxy for over-investment. In the logistic 
regression, I create a dummy variable of Over_In to indicate more/less overinvestment. If 
residual > median value of residuals in the sample, I define it as more overinvestment, 
and then equals to 1. If residual < median value of residuals in the sample, I define it as 
less overinvestment, and then equals to 0. AQ is a proxy for financial reporting quality. 
Union*AQ is the product of unionization rate and AQ as the interaction variable. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients and are corrected for time-
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series correlation using Huber-White standard errors clustered by firms. The detailed 
variable description is in Appendix A.  
Over_Ini,t (Dummy_Over) = α + ϭ1Unioni,t + ϭ2AQi,t + ϭ3Union*AQi,t + ԑi,t 
 
Model   α ϭ1 ϭ2 ϭ3 Adjusted R2 
OLS Regression 
 0.072 -0.753 -0.244 -0.676 0.051 
 28.90 (-7.39) (-8.87) (-3.13)  
  α ϭ1 ϭ2 ϭ3 Pseudo R2 
Logistic 
Regression 
 -0.024 -1.869 -2.523 -13.459 0.025 
  (-0.68) (-10.04) (-7.67) (-4.3)   
 
 Table 6–Panel A reports the similar strongly negative correlation between labor 
unions and underinvestment and the negative association between AQ and 
underinvestment. Table 6—Panel B shows the association between labor unions and 
overinvestment results. The negative correlation between labor unions and 
overinvestment still holds in this test. We can see that the coefficient of AQ is 
significantly negative on both the OLS regression and the logistic regression, which is 
consistent with prior research findings. Further, considering the interaction variable, I 
also can argue that with higher financial reporting quality, labor unions are associated 
with lower underinvestment and overinvestment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I examine the impact of labor unions on underinvestment and 
overinvestment problems. Using a large sample of U.S. listed firms with available firm-
year investment financial data and industry union rates as proxies for firm-level 
unionization, I find that the level of underinvestment and overinvestment decreases with 
labor union power. Adding financial reporting quality as an independent variable, my 
results are consistent with prior research results that financial reporting quality is 
negatively associated with underinvestment and overinvestment. I also find evidence that 
firms with higher financial reporting and labor unionization are complementary in 
mitigating underinvestment and overinvestment problems. 
 My study provides important implications for the impact of labor unions on firm 
investment efficiency. One possible explanation of labor unions reducing 
underinvestment and overinvestment is the reduction of agency costs. Labor unions 
perform an important monitoring role in firms thereby resulting in reducing agency 
problems and consequently any overinvestment and underinvestment problems. My study 
is the first study that links labor unions, investment efficiency and financial reporting 
quality, suggesting that labor unions and financial reporting quality function together to 
improve investment efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FURTHER WORK 
 In my study, I pursue the general idea that strong labor unions have positive 
impact on firms’ underinvestment and overinvestment. There are several ways to improve 
and extend my findings. First, I assume that labor unions and financial reporting quality 
are independently affecting investment efficiency. However, there is a possibility that 
labor unions improves investment efficiency through their impact on improving financial 
reporting quality. Second, I provide evidence that labor unionization is negatively 
associated with underinvestment and overinvestment, but I have not tested possible 
channels through which labor unions may impact them. The possible testing variables 
could include: a) earnings quality or conservatism, b) corporate governance variables 
(e.g., board of directors, G-index, product market competition), c) various industry 
factors (e.g., labor-intensive industries vs. capital-intensive industries), and d) state 
factors (e.g., union-friendly states vs. other states).  
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APPENDIX 
 
A: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
Variable Description 
Union 
An industry-level unionization rate calculated as the number of unions 
members divided by the number of total employees in that industry. I 
used the industry-level unionization rate as a proxy for firm-level 
unionization. 
Over_In Positive residuals from the expected investment expenditure model IV. 
Under_In Negative residuals from the expected investment expenditure model IV. 
AQ 
The standard deviation of the firm level residuals from the Dechow and 
Dichev model during the year t-5 to t-1. See the discussion in Section 
4.3. 
Union*AQ The product of unionization rate and accruals quality. 
In_Tol 
Total investment expenditure calculated as the sum of capital 
expenditures (CAPX), acquisitions (Acq) and research and development 
expenditures (RD), minus sales of property, plant, and equipment 
(SPPE). 
In_Maintenance 
I take amortization and depreciation expenditure as a proxy for 
In_Maintenance.  
In_New The difference between In_Tol and In_Maintenance. 
V/P 
The growth opportunities estimated as the ratio of value of assets in 
place, VAIP, to market value of equity, P, V/P. See the discussion in 
Section 4.1.b. 
Leverage The sum of book value of short-term and long-term debt scaled by the 
sum of the book value of total debt and the book value of equity. 
Cash The balance of cash and short-term investment deflated by total asset 
measured at the beginning of the year. 
Age The log of the number of years the firm has been listed on CRSP at the 
start of the year. 
Size The log of total assets measured at the start of the year. 
Stock Returns The change in market value of the firm over the prior year. 
Year Indicator The dummy variables to capture annual fixed effects. 
Industry 
Indicator 
The dummy variables to capture industry fixed effects by using Fama-
French 48-industry grouping. 
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